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APOLLO LUNAR MODULE LANDING GEAR 
By William F. Rogers * 
ABSTRACT 
The Apollo lunar module landing-gear flight-performance results and three prin-
cipal gear development problems are discussed in this report. In evaluating the lunar 
module touchdown performance, strut stroking and toppling stability are the prime 
factors and are governed primarily by touchdown velocity and surface slope at the touch-
down point. Flight results are shown to be well within design values, and the landing-
gear has performed successfully in all landings. 
INTRODUCTION 
The landing of the lunar module (LM) on the surface of the moon is one of the 
crucial events of the Apollo mission. During touchdown, the LM landing gear brings 
the vehicle to rest while preventing toppling, absorbing the landing impact energy, and 
limiting loads induced into the LM structure. 
The purpose of this report is to summarize the landing-gear flight-performance 
results and some of the problemf! encountered during development. Three important 
development problems are discussed: (1) use of a statistical approach to determine 
realistically the touchdown stability when worst-case combinations of parameters 
showed unacceptable performance, (2) a significant increase in thermal insulation that 
was required just before the first lunar landing, and (3) development of the strut bearing. 
GENERAL DESIGN REQUffiEMENTS 
The landing-gear-subsystem hardware-design requirements may be divided into 
three general categories: structural, mechanical, and landing performance. The 
categories are summarized in table I, and the listed items constitute the general stand-
ards that were used in determining the adequacy of the landing-gear-subsystem design. 
The criticality of the landing gear is apparent. Structural or mechanical failure during 
touchdown could result in loss of life, depending on the mode of failure and whether any 
attempted ascent-stage abort during landing proved to be successful. Failure to achieve 
proper touchdown conditions or failure to land in an area of specified lunar-surface 
topography could result in an unstable landing or in structural failure because of over-
stroking a strut. 
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CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION 
The Apollo 11 LM on the lunar surface is shown in figure 1, which illustrates the 
overall LM and landing-gear configuration. A landing-gear assembly, in both the 
stowed and the deployed positions, is shown in figure 2, and the major components are 
shown in figure 3. Each of the four separate landing-gear assemblies has energy-
absorption capability provided by honeycomb cartridges in the single primary and the 
two secondary struts. The deployment truss serves as a structural-mechanical as-
sembly between the landing-gear struts and the descent-stage structure. Each landing-
gear leg is retained in the stowed position by a pyrotechnic uplock device. When the 
device is fired, a titanium strap that is attached to the primary strut and the descent 
stage is severed, which allows the landing gear to be deployed and locked by mecha-
nisms on each side of the landing-gear assembly. 
The primary strut (fig. 4), which is attached to the LM descent-stage outrigger 
assembly, consists of a lower inner cylinder that fits into an upper outer cylinder to 
provide compression stroking at touchdown. The footpad, which is attached to the 
lower end of the inner cylinder by a ball-joint fitting, is approximately 0.91 meter 
(3 feet) in diameter and is designed to support the LM on a 0.69 N/cm2 (1. 0 lb/in2) 
bearing-strength surface as well as to maintain sliding capability after having impacted 
rocks or ledges during touchdown. Attached to each of three of the footpads is a 
1. 73-meter (68 inch) probe designed to sense lunar-surface proximity and to Signal the 
LM pilot so that he can initiate descent-engine shutdown. The secondary struts (fig. 5) 
also have an inner and an outer cylinder and are capable of both tension and compres-
sion stroking. Detailed descriptions of the landing gear may be found in references 1 
and 2. 
LANDING-GEAR DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS 
Statistical Landing Performance 
A major change in the treatment of the landing-performance input parameters 
occurred as a result of the descent-engine thrust-decay time history. For design 
purposes, a thrust-decay time of approximately 0.5 second had been assumed. How-
ever, a thrust decay of several seconds, which was an extremely destabilizing influence 
at touchdown, was evident in the actual descent-engine firing data. When the actual 
thrust-decay time history was combined in a worst-case way with other touchdown 
parameters, the LM toppling-stability boundary lay well within the design velocity 
envelope, as illustrated in figure 6. For acceptable stability within the range of touch-
down velocities considered, this boundary must lie outside the design envelope. At-
tempts to reduce the engine thrust-decay time by hardware changes were unsuccessful; 
therefore, the manner in which the touchdown parameters were combined for design 
was investigated as a potential solution. 
Investigation of the touchdown parameters from piloted simulations revealed that 
the initial conditions at touchdown did not combine in a worst-case fashion. Further-
more, sufficient data were available to treat the data statistically. Another parameter 
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that affects touchdown performance significantiy is the lunar -surface topography. To 
make the analysis as realistic as possible, a statistical description of the lunar sur-
face, which consisted of general surface slopes and surface protuberances and depres-
sions, was derived from Lunar Orbiter photography. Descriptions of potential Apollo 
landing sites were formulated, and the most severe site, based on general surface 
slope, was chosen for the analysis. The results of the analysis, which are shown in 
figure 6, indicate the degree of risk involved at touchdown. The analysis showed that 
the chances of fully stroking any strut was only one in a thousand and that the probabil-
ity of an unstable landing on slopes of 12° or less was two in a thousand landings. The 
probability of an unstable landing, when considering all slopes in the landing site, was 
somewhat higher but was still acceptable. Although these probabilities are based on a 
Monte Carlo statistical analysis, considerable conservatism is involved. The stability 
analysis is based entirely on constrained-footpad-type landings; that is, footpad slid-
ing is not considered in calculating toppling stability. For the calculations of stroking, 
the energy -absorption characteristics of the lunar soil are not considered except for . 
friction as a result of footpad sliding. Furthermore, the statistical.surface description 
is based on the Apollo site that has the most severe topography of the Apollo landing 
sites originally considered. Finally, no crew selectivity was assumed to be involved 
in chOOSing the touchdown point within the landing site. Actual landings on the lunar 
surface have verified the conservatism involved. All landings have resulted in footpad 
sliding, the lunar soil absorbed a large percentage of the impact energy, and the LM 
crews have been able to use some judgment in chOOSing a landing site in spite of the 
dust encountered before touchdown. This analYSiS, which was used to certify the ad-
equacy of the LM landing performance, constituted a criterion change because of the 
method of combining design parameters. 
Thermal Insulation 
Landing-gear thermal insulation must maintain the landing-gear temperatures at 
or below design levels to ensure positive structural margins of safety and proper me-
chanical operation during deployment and landing. Furthermore, temperature control 
of the honeycomb energy absorbers within specified limits is necessary to preclude 
large variations in crush-load levels. A summary of the history of the landing-gear 
thermal-insulation weights is provided in table II. 
A significant thermal-design problem was caused by the effects of descent-engine-
plume heating near the lunar surface. A few months before Apollo 11, test data indi-
cated that heating rates on the landing gear were much higher than anticipated. At 
approximately the same time, the LM flight crew expressed a desire to have the option 
of using either the probe mode or the pad mode for landing. The probe mode is the 
primary procedure for LM touchdown and consists of descent-engine shutdown initiation 
after probe contact with the lunar surface but before footpad contact. The pad mode is 
considered a backup landing mode in which engine thrust is terminated after footpad 
contact. Inclusion of the pad mode resulted in even higher predicted heating rates for 
the landing gear. Consequently, the Apollo 11 landing -gear thermal-insulation weight 
was increased to 31. 03 kilograms (68.4 pounds), as shown in table II. A refined 
analysis allowed reduction of the landing-gear-insulation weight on subsequent vehicles 
so that it represents approximately 8 percent of the total landing-gear weight. This 
particular problem illustrates a hardware change made as a result of improved test 
data and a change in operational procedures. 
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Primary-Strut- Bearing Design 
An important design detail in the landing gear is that of the primary strut bear-
ings (fig. 4). The bearing friction must be maintained within close tolerances because 
it accounts for 10 to 20 percent of the total force in the strut, thereby affecting both 
structural loads and landing performance. The friction depends on the hearing shape 
and the clearances, which are temperature dependent. Many component and gear-
assembly tests were conducted to optimize the bearing friction. The effects of con-
figuration on the effective coefficient of friction, which varies from approximately 
0.05 on a flat surface to approximately O. 21 as the effective value based on the side 
load at the footpad, are illustrated in figure 7. BecaUSE? footpad side load determines 
the bearing normal load, it is important to base the friction on the footpad load as well 
as to realize that the effective coefficient differs considerably from the actual coeffi-
cient based on normal force at the bearing. Additionally, thermal analysis must ensure 
that a positive clearance always exists between the bearing and the strut, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of very large axial loads as a result of binding. This devel-
opment problem illustrates the importance of attention to detail in the landing-gear 
mechanical deSign. 
FLIGHT-PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
Before the Apollo 11 miSSion, LM landing performance and landing- gear func-
tional operation had been demonstrated by analysis and by extensive ground tests. 
During these tests, the landing gear was exposed to all significant flight environments, 
including vehicle drop tests under simulated lunar-gravity conditions. Landing-gear 
deployment has been successfully accomplished on eight Apollo missions. Of the five 
lunar landings attempted, all were successful. The landing- gear touchdown-
performance results may be summarized by considering two of the pertinent parameters, 
surface slope at the touchdown point and touchdown velocities, which are summarized in 
figure 8. In all cases, the touchdown velocities were within design limits. The actual 
slopes at the touchdown point are compared with the landing- site slope statistics used 
in the touchdown analysiso The slope curves may be interpreted by choosing a partic-
ular slope (for example, 11 0, the Apollo 15 touchdown slope at Hadley-Apennine) and 
reading the corresponding value of approximately 95 percent on the ordinate. This 
states that 95 percent of the slopes at this landing site are 11 0 or less. For all landings, 
vehicle attitudes and angular rates during touchdown have been low, indicating very 
stable landings. 
Gear stroking in all landings has been minimal. The lunar soil has absorbed an 
estimated 60 percent of the touchdown energy through footpad penetration and sliding, 
resulting in secondary- strut tension stroking of about 10 centimeters (4 inches). A 
small amount of primary- strut stroking has occurred in some instances. 
126 
CONCL UDING REMARKS 
Problems encountered during the development of the LM landing gear have been 
solved, and at no time did the availability of landing-gear hardware jeopardize the 
Apollo Program schedule. The problems were solved by various means, some by 
hardware changes and some by criteria changes when such changes had a rational 
basis. It is concluded that the landing gear met the Apollo design requirements and 
that development problems were solved before flight. 
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DISCUSSION 
J. T. Hinricks: 
Ultimately, what material was selected for primary-strut bearings? 
Rogers: 
The primary-strut bearings are made of aluminum and are coated with a moly-
disulfide dry-film lubricant. 
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TABLE 1. - GENERAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
Category Requirement 
Structural Withstand loads and conditions imposed by the natural 
and induced environments 
Maintain strut loads within the LM structural design 
requirements 
Mechanical Deploy and lock down in lunar orbit 
In the stowed position, clear the S-NB stage and the 
LM adapter during the ejection maneuver 
Landing performance Provide sufficient energy -absorption capability at 
touchdown 
Provide adequate toppling stability at touchdown 
Provide sufficient clearance on lunar surface to 
avoid impact of descent-stage structure, tanks, 
and plumbing (descent-engine skirt allowed to 
crush on surface contact) 
Maintain tilt angle within specified limits for ascent-
stage lift-off 
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TABLE II. - LANDING-GEAR THERMAL-INSULATION WEIGHT HISTORY 
Approximate Weight, kg (lb) Remarks date 
Nov. 1964 3.63 (8) Thermal-paint estimate; no thermal blankets 
or plume shielding defined 
Mar. 1967 ~9. 98 (22) Reaction control system plume -impingement 
requirement 
Feb. 1969 13.34 (29.4) Apollo 9 miSSion, actual 
May 1969 13.34 (29.4) Apollo 10 mission, actual 
June 1969 31. 03 (68.4) Apollo 11 mission, actual; weight change 
caused by thrust until footpad contact and 
increased heating rates on landing gear 
Nov. 1969 29.44 (64.9) Apollo 12 miSSion, actual 
Apr. 1970 17.10 (37. 7) Apollo 13 and subsequent miSSions, actual 
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Figure 1. - Apollo 11 LM on the lunar surface. 
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Figure 2. - Stowed and deployed positions of the landing gear. 
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Figure 3. - The LM landing gear. 
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Figure 4. - Landing-gear primary strut. 
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Figure 5. - Landing-gear secondary strut. 
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Figure 6. - Landing-performance analyses. 
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Figure 7. - Strut-bearing friction. 
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Figure 8. - The LM flight-performance results. 
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